Banks and high leverage debt by Randall J. Pozdena
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTE8
December 8, 1989
Banks and High Leverage Debt
When the average degree of leverage in the
economy rises, it is not surprising to observe an
increase, on the margin, of lower quality debt.
One manifestation of this in the primary securi-
ties markets is the issuance of "junk" bonds, or
securities of below-investment-grade quality. In
the banking environment, the market pressures
for increased leverage have fueled growth in
loans that finance highly leveraged transactions
(HLTs) in the economy.
A high degree of leverage in the corporate sector
is a source of concern because, some argue, it
may make the economy less resilient in the event
of an economic downturn. Moreover, the pres-
ence of HLT loans in bank portfolios is of special
concern because these loans expose banks to
increased risk, thereby potentially imperilling
the banking system. Some economists feel that
the credit-intermediation and payment-system
functions that banks perform are not easily repli-
cated by other institutions in our economy and
thus deserve special insulation from such risks.
This Letter discusses the origins and nature of
HLT debt in bank portfolios. HLT lending is a
significant component of bank portfolios. Regula-
tors must be wary to avoid concentrations of this
lending, particularly in capital-deficient banks.
Banks and HLT debt
Bank HLT ,lending is strongly associated with the
present merger and corporate control phenome-
non. According to data from a recent Federal
Reserve survey, 60 percent of the lending to
highly-leveraged businesses was associated with
leveraged buyouts (LBOs), 24 percent with
equity buybacks, and four percent was extended
to ESOPs (employee stock ownership plans). The
Federal Reserve defines high leverage financing
as credit extended for restructurings or acquisi-
tions resulting in a debt-to-asset ratio of 75
percent or more on the part ofthe borrower.
Mergers, acquisitions, ana internal refinancings
involve decisions about the financial structure
of firms, including choices regarding the ratio of
debt-to-equity and the types of debt instruments
that will be used. As previous issues ofthis Letter
(April 10, 1987, and November 24, 1989) have
demonstrated, it is likelythat recentchanges in
the tax system have stimulated increased useof
debt by u.s. corporations. This increase in>corpo-
rate leverage, in turn, has resulted in deteriora-
tion in the rated quality of outstanding corporate
debt and an increase in the issuance of new,
below-investment-grade debt.
Thus, the increase in HLT financing at banks and
elsewhere reflects these incentives to increase
the leverage of business enterprises. However,
the extent and type of involvement of banks in
such lending is limited by several general reg-
ulations. National banks, for example, may not
invest in equities and may invest only in invest-
ment grade bonds, limiting banks' direct hold-
ings of junk bonds and other "mezzanine"-type
securities. Also, unsecured lending to asingle
borrower is limited to an amount less than 15
percent of a bank's capital. Similar restrictions
apply to banks with other types of charters,
as well.
A bank can minimize the impact of some of
these constraints by establishing venture capital
or commercial finance companies as subsidiaries
separate from the bank. Nonetheless, regulatory
restrictions have had a strong impact on the
extent and nature of banking organizations'
involvement in the HLT debt markets. The loans
made by banks tend to be term loans, and tend
to be senior debt secured by the assets of the
borrowing corporation. The HLT term loans have
interest rates that are 1Y2 to two percentage
points over prime. Most HLT loans are originated
by one of the large commercial banks, which
then sells 75 to 90 percent ofthe obligation to
other banks (typically, foreign and regional
banks).
Banks have not been as heavily involved in the
other main HLT debt market, the so-called bridgeHLT Lending by Banks
As aShare of:
l()anmarkeLBridgelending.involvesshort-term
(thre~ tofour month) loans that providecorpora-
tions with tempor¥yfunding vyhiletheperma-
nent.sources are assembled. Th~large .Ioan sizes
and rel(j.tivelyaccelerated ~valuation processes
involv~dinsLJch I~nding ar~notwell suited to
therhgulatory environment in which. banks oper-
at~.Moreov~r, the waythes~ bridge loans are
syn<:iicated t~ndsto afford banks less discretion
over the terms of theirparticipation than theyor
theirregulators cOnsider desirable. Banks have
participated in the bridge Ipan market, however,
via pooled funding mechanisms set up byinv~st­
ment banks or other commercial banks.
The risks
Theaggregate sc:ale of I-ILT-related lending is not
easy tocalculatebecause the various surveys of
bankportfplios~mploydifferent definitions of
HLT debt. private sector studies conducted as
ofearly 1989 sugg~st that between $70 and $80
billion.ofbankassets could beconsidered HLT-
related lending. This represents 12 to 13 percent
pftotal commercial and industrial (C&I) loans by
banks,and two to three percent oftotal commer-
ciaLbankassets. More recently,as partof the
Share,dt'lational Creditprogram,various bal)k
regulators inventoriedHLT debt. Using asome-
whatbroader definitionof HLT financing, their
estimate for 1989 was nearly twice this size, at
$175 billion. To date, lending appears to be
growing atabout a 15 to 20 percent annual. rate.
Even ifthe moremodest, private sector estimates
are used, HLT debt is large relative to the capital
Should banks extend HLT debt?
For some, risk considerations call into question
the appropriateness of bank involvement in HLT
debt markets. They argue that bank and thrift
involvement in high risk investments may be
merely a means of exploiting the deposit insur-
ance guarantee and as such, jeopardizes the
stability of the banking system. At the same time,
however, there are legitimate reasons for bank
involvement in the HLT debt market.
Although the performance of HLT debt held by
banks to date has generally created no major
problems for banks, the banks themselves
(according to survey responses) expect about a
70 percent higher charge-off rate for HLT debt
than for other C&I lending. Moreover, charge-offs
rose significantly in 1988, after a decline in 1987.
Nevertheless, risk in HLT-related financing
remains an important concern of bank regula-
tors. Federal Reserve surveys show that the
majority of bank HLT loans (56 percent) rely
on corporate cash flow (versus open-market
refinancing or asset sales) for repayment of the
loans. Should cash flows deteriorate because
of adverse economic conditions, a substantial
number of loans would not perform as expected.
There appears to be fairly broad industrial
diversification of HLT debt exposures at banks.
Ofthe financings assembled in 1988, 50 percent
were in manufacturing, 40 percent in the serv-
ices industry, and 10 percent in natural resource
sectors. In addition, the syndication process
limits anyone bank's exposure significantly. Few
banks have more than $50 million invested in an
individual financing, even though regulations
would permit as much as $90 million (unse-
cured) and $150 million on a secured basis for a
$10 billion bank. The largest HLT lenders have
portfolios comprising 75 or more individual HLT
financings.
cushion of the banks involved and is, by its
nature, a riskier asset than a conventional credit.
At.present,the stock of outstanding HLT-related
debtis equivalent to at least 40 percent of the
equity of all commercial banks, or about half the
concentration observed for LDC debt at its peak.
For the .ten largest HLT lenders together, this ratio
stands at about 60 percent, and ranges as high as
140 percent forthe most actively involved
institutions.
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Based on 1988 and 1989 data.First, bank participation in the HLT debt market
is consistent with the credit-intermediation role
of banks in our economy. In particular, a number
of economists argue that banks exist because of
their superior ability to monitor risky loans.
While direct placement markets (commercial
paper and bond markets) can serve firms with
well-known reputations and obvious cash-flow
characteristics, lenders with more intimate in-
formation about the borrower are needed to serve
the financing needs of more idiosyncratic mar-
kets. On these grounds, it may be logical for
banks to serve components of the HLT market
that cannot be more efficiently served by direct
placement markets and venture capital firms.
Second, although HLT debt is risky, it can safely
be held in the portfolios of banks that have suffi-
cient capital to protect liability holders and the
deposit insurance fund from the attendant risks.
Indeed, having sufficient capital at risk gives
banks an incentive to scrutinize and monitor HLT
credits carefully.
This reasoning suggests, however, that it may be
prudent to restrict HLT-related lending (and other
risky activities) at institutions with thin capital
cushions. Under the present deposit insurance
system, a thinly-capitalized bank can obtain its
deposits at rates that do not vary significantly
with the bank's level of portfolio risk. At these
institutions, management will have an incentive
to operate with minimum capital, and to over-
invest in risky projects without adequate
controls.
Strong capital is the key
HLT lending by banks very likely is a manifes-
tation of the broader trend toward increased
leverage in our economy. Allowing banks to
respond to this trend by providing HLT credit
services enhances competition in these markets
and promotes economic efficiency. Therefore, it
is important that sound banks be allowed to par-
ticipate in the provision of HLT credit services.
To properly discipline the participation of insured
banks in such markets, however, this activity
(and other risky activities) should be restricted
to those banks with generous capital positions.
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